Американская военная машина. Глубинная политика, глобальная связь ЦРУ с наркотиками и путь в Афганистан - Питер Дейл Скотт

Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, April 26, 1976, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Report No. 94-755, bk.1, Foreign and Military Intelligence, 453).

66. Fineman, A Special Relationship, 183.

67. The biggest Hmong immigration into Thailand was after World War II, when with other hill tribes they started “planting poppies all over Thailand’s mountainous northern provinces” (Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 118).

68. Fineman, A Special Relationship, 183.

69. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, 36: “Small groups of Lao soldiers had, unofficially, been trained [at U.S. expense] at Thai military bases since 1957.”

70. Fineman, A Special Relationship, 183. According to Warner, it was among the Hmong (“Meo”) of northern Thailand that PARU and Lair first heard of Vang Pao (Warner, Back Fire, 32).

71. For a more detailed account of U.S. interventions in 1958–1960, in which CAT played a significant role, see Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 128–33.

72. William M. Leary, “Foreword,” in Covert Ops: The CIA’s Secret War in Laos, by James E. Parker (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), x. Leary’s account of “CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955–1974,” is posted on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia

.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art7.html.

73. Martin E. Goldstein, American Policy toward Laos (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1973), 135: “In 1956, for example, the United States spent $47.7 million on defense support [for Laos] and only $1 million on technical cooperation.”

74. Editorial note, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 16, 478.

75. Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base, “Escalation in Laos,” http://udornrtafb

.tripod.com/id15.html.

76. John Morrocco, Thunder from Above: Air War, 1941–1968 (Boston: Boston Press, 1984), 10.

77. Lucian R. W. Pye, “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization,” in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 87–89. At the same conference Guy Pauker of RAND urged Indonesian officers present to “strike, sweep their house clean” (224), quoted in Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967,” Pacific Affairs 58, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 239–64. Some of those present played important roles in the subsequent Indonesian coup of 1965.

78. Grant Evans, A Short History of Laos: The Land in Between (Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2002), 113.

79. Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 108. William Leary has written on the CIA’s website that “the appearance of the Americans coincided with the outbreak of fighting between the FAR and Pathet Lao.” But, as we have seen, the first U.S. troops arrived in March, while the fighting began only some time after May.

80. Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos, 104.

81. Paper prepared by Assistant White House Staff Secretary John S. D. Eisenhower, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 16, 548.

82. Telegram of August 9, 1959, to the State Department, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 16, 555–56.

83. Dulles briefing to National Security Council, August 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 16, 553.

84. Bernard Fall, Street without Joy (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1964), 334.

85. Bernard Fall, Anatomy of a Crisis: The Laotian Crisis of 1960–1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), 115.

86. Hugh Toye, Laos: Buffer State or Battleground (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 126.

87. Leann Grabavoy Almquist, Joseph Alsop and American Foreign Policy: The Journalist as Advocate (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), 9–10, cf. 76.

88. Almquist, Joseph Alsop and American Foreign Policy, 57.

89. Almquist, Joseph Alsop and American Foreign Policy, 80.

90. Hersh, The Old Boys, 307–8, 438.

91. After I published a reference to “Alsop’s ‘invasion’” in 1970, one of my contacts, probably at the New York Review of Books, had a mutual friend ask Alsop about his 1959 scare article. Alsop allegedly replied in effect that he was just a team player trying to help out. Helping whom to achieve what, one wonders.

92. Fall, Street without Joy, 334–35; cf. Fall, Anatomy of a Crisis, 136; Denis Warner, The Last Confucian (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 210.

93. Leary, “Foreword,” x.

94. Scott, The War Conspiracy, 72. Cf. Leary’s further details about the CIA’s preparations on the CIA’s website: “The summer of 1959 saw the introduction into Laos of a US Special Forces Group, codenamed Hotfoot, under the command of Lt. Col. Arthur ‘Bull’ Simons. Twelve Mobile Training Teams took up duties at Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Savannekhet, and Pakse. The appearance of the Americans coincided with the outbreak of fighting between the FAR and Pathet Lao. In light of these developments, CIA officials in Laos requested additional air transport resources” (William M. Leary, “CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955–1974,” https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art7.html, emphasis added).

95. Dulles NSC briefing of December 23, 1959, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 16, 491.

96. Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos, 109–10.

97. Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization (New York: Praeger, 1971), 133; Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos, 110–11. Stuart-Fox cites the example of Sam Neua province, where the Pathet Lao was in power, yet their candidate received thirteen votes, while the CDNI’s received 6,508.

98. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, 23. I have shown elsewhere that Eisenhower’s approval of the Air America flights, like his earlier approval of the PSB D-23 rollback program, was belated, ratifying flights that had begun months earlier (Scott, The War Conspiracy, 78–85, expanding slightly on Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 133–38).

99. Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos, 114.

100. Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos, 115.

101. Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos, 116. According to Grant Evans, “some 600 people were killed” (A Short History of Laos, 119).

102. Warner, Back Fire, 32–33 (PARU-trained troops); Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, 38 (PARU technicians). PARU may also have supplied training to the Cambodian Khmer Serai irregulars, recruited in South Vietnam, who according to Wilfred Burchett raided Cambodia from bases in Thailand in 1956 and 1957 (Wilfrid Burchett, The Second Indochina War: Cambodia and Laos [New York: International Publishers, 1970], 41). By 1959,